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INTRODUCTION
In the State of Utah v. Rodney Holm,' the Utah Supreme Court consi-
dered the case of a polygamist marriage. Rodney Holm, a police officer in
Hildale, Utah, followed the religious practice of the fundamentalist Mor-
mons. He legally married one woman and subsequently was "sealed"2 with
two other wives in private, religious ceremonies. Anxious to convict Holm
on bigamy charges, the Utah Attorney General's office requested that the
second spiritual marriage, the one with Ruth Stubbs, be adjudicated to be a
common-law marriage. The lower court agreed to adjudicate the marriage,
and subsequently found Holm guilty on multiple charges of bigamy. When
the case arrived before the Utah Supreme Court, it turned on the question of
whether or not the informal, spiritual marriage between Holm and Stubbs
* J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School 2011. My thanks to the conference organizers
for providing such a rich forum for discussion, the symposium participants for creating such
interesting connections and providing feedback, and the Law Review staff for their role in
both organizing the symposium and producing this issue.
I. State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, 137 P.3d 726.
2. Id. at 143, 137 P.3d at 762.
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could legally be defined as marriage. At stake, the court observed, were
"important questions about the State's ability to regulate marital relation-
ships and prevent the formation and propagation of marital forms that the
citizens of the State deem harmful."3  The concern that preoccupied the
court, however, was not the propagation of inappropriate forms of marriage,
but rather the repetition of appropriate forms and "the indicia of marriage
[being] repeated more than once."4
This Article offers a reading of State v. Holm that highlights the Utah
court's struggle to define marriage and presents the court's eventual defini-
tion of marriage as one that is based on visual indicators. Although a visual
notion of marriage may seem idiosyncratic and out of place in the legal do-
main-this is the perspective put forth by the dissent in Holm-visuality
connects to traditional ideas of performance, publicity, and place. Marriage
made visible, performed before a public audience, enables and affirms the
values attached to publicity-procedural transparency, evidentiary proof,
and social legitimacy. A wedding ceremony invites public participation and
allows the spectators to both witness pronouncements of fidelity and endow
legitimating status on the married couple. However, bringing public into
the process also raises question about which public. Publicity and public
viewing attach to some particular communities, and it is important to keep
in mind how each community defines itself through fundamental values.
I. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE WIVES: POLYGAMY'S IDIOSYNCRATIC INSIGHT
In 2002, the Attorney General charged Rodney Holm with felony bi-
gamy and two counts of unlawful sex with a minor, his plural wife Ruth
Stubbs. The Attorney General's successful prosecution a year earlier of
Tom Green, a high-profile polygamist,5 helped spur the office into action, as
did a growing awareness about the plight of child brides in polygamous
3. Id. at 57, 137 P.3d at 743.
4. Id. at T 26, 137 P.3d at 736 (citing State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, 47, 99 P.3d
820, 832).
5. Tom Green began to make the media rounds in the late 1980s in order to public-
ize the message of plural marriage. "Between 1988 and 2001, Green appeared on various
television shows with the women, consistently referring to the women as his wives, and the
women likewise acknowledged spousal relationships." Green, 2004 UT 76, 6 , 99 P.3d at
823. According to one scholar, this
string of appearances included stints on such evening news shows as NBC's Date-
line NBC, ABC's 20/20, and CNBC's Rivera Live, on such syndicated daytime talk
shows as The Sally Jesse Raphael Show, Queen Latifah, and The Jerry Springer
Show, and even in a documentary made by a French television station.
Ryan D. Tenney, Tom Green, Common-law Marriage, and the Illegality of Putative Polyga-
my, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 141, 143 n.14 (2002). Media commentators called Tom Green's case
Utah's "first [high-profile] bigamy case for fifty years." Polygamy on Trial in Utah, BBC
NEWS (May 14, 2001, 14:34 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas 1329977.stm.
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marriages.6 The Holm case, like the Green case, was a result of significant
media attention because Ruth Stubbs had fled from her marital home in
December of 2001, and thereafter publicly denounced the plural marriage
practice, its coercive nature, and its detrimental effects on underage girls.'
A. A Runaway Bride and a Custody Dispute
Ruth Stubbs was nineteen when she left Rodney Holm.8 She had al-
ready been married for three years and given birth to two children. Rulon
Jeffs, the leader of a breakaway Mormon sect known as .the Fundamentalist
Church of Latter-day Saints (FLDS), ordered Ruth Stubbs to marry Mr.
Holm in 1998.' Stubbs had gone to see Jeffs in order to request permission
to marry someone else, "a young man she had been seeing secretly for sev-
eral months."' Jeffs declined to consider her plan, saying "[i]t comes to me
that you belong to Rod [Holm]," a man who was twice her age and already
married to Stubbs's sister." Stubbs testified that Jeffs, the man she recog-
nized as her prophet, had said that she would "lose [her] salvation if [she]
didn't marry [Holm].""2 Stubbs was subsequently "sealed" to Rodney Holm
the very next day with her two sister-brides in attendance as bridesmaids.'3
Jeffs presided over this sealing ceremony. "No marriage certificate was
issued. Ruth had no right to community property."' 4 Three years after the
marriage, Stubbs left home because of abusive conditions, taking her two
children, and a legal whirlwind ensued. Holm initiated legal proceedings,
6. See Catherine Blake, The Sexual Victimization of Teenage Girls in Utah: Poly-
gamous Marriages Versus Internet Sex Predators, 7 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 289 (2005).
7. Adam Liptak, Polygamist's Custody Fight Raises Many Issues, N.Y. TIMES,
June 16, 2002, at 14.
8. John Dougherty, Bound by Fear: Polygamy in Arizona, PitX. NEW TIMES (Mar.
13, 2003), http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2003-03-13/news/bound-by-fear-polygamy-in-
arizona/.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Liptak, supra note 7. Her sister was agitating for the marriage to take place,
according to reports.
[Ruth] tried to postpone the wedding for several weeks, but her sister-who
wanted Ruth to join the family to help her in a power struggle with the other
wife-pressured Ruth to move forward. "Suzie told me I was an asshole" for
wanting to delay the marriage, Ruth said. "Suzie told me that the town, the whole
town, already knew I was supposed to marry Rod."
Dougherty, supra note 8.
12. Liptak, supra note 7. The same story is told in many news outlets, including
David Kelly and Gary Cohn, Insider Accounts Put Sect Leader on the Run, SEATTLE TIMES,
May 16, 2006; Mark Havnes, 'Wife' Testifies in Opening of Bigamy Trial, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Aug. 13, 2003, at B2.
13. Liptak, supra note 7, at 14.
14. Dougherty, supra note 8.
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suing for custody of the children. 5 Very quickly, however, other legal is-
sues came to the forefront, including "serious questions about religious
freedom, the sexual exploitation of teenagers by religious institutions and a
law enforcement official's obligations to obey the law in his personal life." 6
County prosecutors began an investigation and decided to pursue bigamy
charges. 7
When the case based on bigamy charges came to trial in August 2003,
Stubbs was among the first to give testimony. 8 The questions directed at
Stubbs related primarily to how she perceived the wedding ceremony and
whether or not she understood her marriage to be legal. Stubbs's lawyer
emphasized that Stubbs knew her marriage was not legal, saying "Stubbs,
however young, knew what she was getting into, and that the union was not
a marriage under Utah civil law but was the result of a religious ceremo-
ny."'9  Paul Graf, the Assistant Attorney General, stressed instead the es-
sential marital nature of the relationship, telling the jury that Stubbs and
Holm "lived as husband and wife... [a]nd did all the things normal, mar-
ried couples do in a relationship."2 Another Assistant Attorney General
asked Stubbs, "Was the word 'marry' used?"2 ' Stubbs said that it was not,
specifying that the terminology used was that she "belong[ed]" to Holm."
Stubbs also "acknowledged the couple did use the words 'I do' but never
received a certificate from the ceremony."23 After a brief deliberation of
under two hours, the jury found Holm guilty on all charges, "indicating on a
special verdict form that Holm was guilty of bigamy both because he 'pur-
ported to marry Ruth Stubbs' and because he had 'cohabited with Ruth
Stubbs,"'24 the two determinative prongs of the Utah bigamy statute.25
15. Liptak, supra note 7.
16. Id.
17. Sean Alfano, Utah Court Upholds Anti-Polygamy Law, CBS NEWS (May 16,
2006), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/05/l 6/national/mainl 622301 .shtml.
18. Havnes, supra note 12.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, 8, 137 P.3d 726, 731-32.
The trial court sentenced Holm to up to five years in state prison on each convic-
tion, to be served concurrently, and imposed a $3,000 fine. Both the prison time
and the fine were suspended in exchange for three years on probation, one year in
the county jail with work release, and two hundred hours of community service.
Id. at 8, 137 P.3d at 732.
25. The Utah bigamy statute provides that "[a] person is guilty of bigamy when,
knowing he has a husband or wife or knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the
person purports to marry another person or cohabits with another person." UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-7-101 (2011).
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On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, the central question remained
defining the term "marriage," as related to the "purports to marry" prong of
the Utah bigamy statute. At the outset, and with great understatement, the
court remarked that the "definition of 'marry,' . . . is disputed."26 Holm
argued that "the word 'marry' . . . refers only to a legally recognized mar-
riage and that, therefore, there is no violation of the 'purports to marry' pro-
vision unless an individual purports to enter into a legally valid marriage."27
Holm's contention was that he and Stubbs never considered their marriage
to be a legal one. The couple never obtained a license and never "contem-
plated ... their relationship would entitle them to any of the legal benefits
attendant to state-sanctioned matrimony."28 Holm also contended that
Utah's statutes referred to legal relationships when they made use of the
term marriage, and that consistency of meaning required "that the term
'marry' should be given the same breadth of meaning wherever it appears in
the Utah Code."29
The court rejected this argument and held that the term marriage "in-
cludes both legally recognized marriages and those that are not state-
sanctioned."3 This expansive definition, the court observed, was supported
"by the plain meaning of the term, the language of the bigamy statute and
the Utah Code, and the legislative history and purpose of the bigamy sta-
tute." According to the court, either law or custom could define the plain
meaning of marriage. With respect to legislative intent, the court remarked
that, "[b]y expressly recognizing unsolemnized marriages and allowing for
a judicial determination to establish a legal marriage ... the Legislature has
acknowledged that the attainment of a marriage license from the State is not
determinative of whether a marriage exists."32 Marriage was not confined to
a legal relationship; it was bounded neither by civil licensing nor by the
intent of the couple. The court allowed marriage to be simultaneously reli-
gious, and civil, private and public, finding that the "language contained in
the bigamy statute [was] not confined to legal marriage and [was], in fact,
broad enough to cover the type of religious solemnization engaged in by
Holm and Stubbs. 33
26. Holm, 2006 UT31, 8, 137P.3dat733.
27. Id. at 7, 137 P.3d at 733.
28. Id. at 13, 137 P.3d at 732.
29. Id. at 24, 137 P.3d at 735.
30. Id. at 18, 137 P.3d at 733.
31. Id.
32. Id. at123, 137 P.3d at 735.
33. Id. at 14, 137 P.3d at 732.
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B. The Failed Work of Dictionaries
The Holm opinion communicates the vast confusion around the defmi-
tion of marriage, and illustrates the difficulty of drawing bright lines of
difference between legal marriage and other, private permutations of an
intimate relationship. In Tom Green's bigamy case, the same court, puz-
zling over the cohabit prong of the bigamy statute, had stated that "[w]ords
are symbols of communication and as such are not invested with the quality
of a scientific formula."34 Because of the instability attached to language,
the Holm court articulated its interpretive strategy before analyzing the
terms: "our primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legis-
lative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the
statute was meant to achieve."35  The court presumed that the legislature
used each term, every time, "according to its ordinary and accepted mean-
ing,"36 and therefore intended to read "the statute as a whole, and interpret
its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related
chapters."37
The concept of plain language-the pursuit and discovery of "ordinary
and accepted meaning"--required the court to turn to the dictionary. The
court found that the Merriam- Webster Dictionary entry defined the common
usage of the term "marriage" very broadly, encompassing relationships
sanctioned by either "law or custom."38 Holm relied instead on Black's Law
Dictionary, which provided a definition of marriage as "[t]he legal union of
a man and woman as husband and wife."39 The court countered this argu-
ment by observing that:
Black's Law Dictionary contains several definitions of different types of marriage
that are, by definition, not legally recognized. For example, "putative marriage" is
"marriage in which husband and wife believe in good faith that they are married,
but for some technical reason are not formally married (as when the ceremonial
official was not authorized to perform a marriage)"; "clandestine marriage" is
"marriage that rests merely on the agreement of the parties" or "marriage entered
into in a secret way, as one solemnized by an unauthorized person or without all
required formalities"; and "void marriage" is "marriage that is invalid from its in-
ception, that cannot be made valid, and that can be terminated by either party with-
out obtaining a divorce or annulment.
'AO
34. State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, 49, 99 P.3d 820, 832 (Utah 2004).
35. Holm, 2006 UT 31, 16, 137 P.3d at 733 (citing Foutz v. City of S. Jordan,
2004 UT 75, 111, 100 P.3d 1171 (Utah 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
36. Id. (citing C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, 9, 977 P.2d 479 (Utah 1999) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
37. Id. (citing Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, 17, 66 P.3d 592 (Utah 2003)).
38. Id. at 19, 137 P.3d at 733.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 20, 137 P.3d at 734.
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Looking at the Utah code, the court suggested that related statutes made
clear the legislature used the term marriage in a similarly fluid way and did
not intend the term marriage to refer uniquely to legal relationships. The
court's interpretation relied on the "unsolemnized marriage" statute,4 and
the Utah "Solemnization of prohibited marriage" statute.4" Taking into ac-
count these examples, the court concluded that consistency existed: "[I]t is
clear that the Legislature did not intend to limit 'marriage,' as it is used
throughout the Utah Code, to legally recognized marriages."43 The court
added that "the Legislature has acknowledged that the attainment of a mar-
nage license from the State is not determinative of whether a marriage ex-
ists."'  The court, therefore, untethered marriage from state licensing, con-
sidered to be the prototypical state intervention into marriage. The outcome
of this analysis was the court's surprising statement that "the license itself is
typically of secondary importance to the participants in a wedding ceremo-
ny. The crux of marriage ... [is] the steps, whether ritualistic or not, by
which two individuals commit themselves to undertake a marital relation-
ship."45 In defining marriage as an unbounded relationship and refusing to
limit the marital relationship to its state sanctioned form, the court explicitly
opened new possibilities for finding, recognizing, and defining marriage.
In her dissent, the Chief Justice of the court disagreed with the majori-
ty's interpretation of the term marriage, suggesting that this definition con-
flated legal and "idiosyncratic meaning."'46 She characterized the majority
analysis and its resulting "expansive definition"'47 of marriage as deeply
flawed, saying:
I do not believe it is appropriate to interpret the term "marry" when it appears in a
state statute as providing what is essentially an anthropological description of hu-
man relationships. To do so is to ignore the fact that the law of our state and our
41. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (2003). The court also relies on Whyte v. Blair,
885 P.2d 791, 793 (Utah 1994) ("[The judicial decree] merely recognizes that a woman and a
man have by their prior consent and conduct entered into a marital relationship, although it
was not theretofore formally solemnized or otherwise legally recognized.").
42. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-15 (2011). This original bill was passed in 2001 and
was "a response to increasing reports of coerced marriages of underage girls in Utah, primar-
ily among polygamist communities." See Recent Developments in Utah Law: Family Law,
2001 UTAH L. REV. 1132, 1132 (2001). The article mentions that Senator Allen had "re-
ceived an e-mail listing 116 child marriages, with names and dates, and cited one particularly
egregious instance where a girl was traded by her parents for a Winnebago." Id. at 1135.
43. Holm, 2006UT31, 23, 137P.3dat735.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 32, 137 P.3d at 737.
46. Id. at T135, 137 P.3d at 759 (Durham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
47. Id. atT 139, 137 P.3d at 761.
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nation has traditionally viewed marriage as denoting a legal status as well as a pri-
vate bond.48
Her dissent emphasized the need to draw and maintain strong boundaries
between private, religious, commitments and the civil marriage: "Any two
people can make private pledges to each other, with or without the assis-
tance of a religious official, but these private commitments are not equiva-
lent to marriage absent a license or an adjudication of marriage."'49 Legal
marriage, she argued, changed a relationship not just through "gravity of...
commitment[]," but also through the "1,138 federal statutory provisions 'in
which benefits, rights, and privileges are contingent on marital status."' 5
Although a couple might consider themselves married, and might even be
married in the eyes of a particular church, subjecting that couple to criminal
penalty for this mis-identification of the relationship would be akin to
disciplining an individual who goes by the name of "Doctor W," but who is not, in
fact, a licensed physician, for violation of state licensing requirements even though
he has never professed to be a legally licensed doctor or to have the medical exper-
5'tise which that status is designed to ensure.
Chief Justice Durham attempted to craft a more narrow definition of mar-
riage, one that would neither equalize all forms of personal commitment by
conflating community, religious, and state forms of marriage, nor conflate
all sources of authority and legitimation.2
C. A White Dress and a Wedding Photographer
Despite the court's manifest lack of ability to settle on a narrowly tai-
lored and precise verbal definition of marriage, an implicit definition of
marriage does emerge. Unable to reach consensus on quite how to make
plain what constitutes a marriage through verbal definition, the qualities that
come to bear on the question are those of visuality and materiality. What
makes a marriage legitimate in this framework is not a particular definition-
al standard or description so much as a set of material circumstances and a
moment of social performance. Marriage exists when the bride wears a
white dress, when there is a religious personage officiating, when there is
cake and photographers.
In Holm, this visual definition of marriage becomes apparent in the re-
peated references to the traditional-looking wedding ceremony in which
48. Id. at 137, 137 P.3d at 760.
49. Id. at 145, 137 P.3d at 763.
50. Id. at 145 & n.7, 137 P.3d 763 & n.7 (quoting U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT 1 (2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf).
51. Id. at 146, 137 P.3d at 763.
52. Id. at 131, 137 P.3d at 758.
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Holm and Stubbs take part. The court describes the "religious marriage
ceremony" that Rodney Holm participated in with the then-sixteen-year-old
Ruth Stubbs:
Stubbs testified that she had worn a white dress, which she considered a wedding
dress; that she and Holm exchanged vows; that Warren Jeffs, a religious leader in
the FLDS religion, conducted the ceremony; that other church members and mem-
bers of Holm's family attended the ceremony; and that photographs were taken of
Holm, Stubbs, and their guests who attended the ceremony.
53
Ruth Stubbs testified that she and Holm had regular sexual relations, that
she had "conceived two children with Holm" before she turned eighteen,54
and that they "regarded each other as husband and wife."5 What reappears
in the decision, however, are not the facts regarding the nature of the
couple's intimate relationship, but rather the details of the ceremony, most
especially the white dress. The white wedding dress, mentioned twice in
the majority opinion and twice in the dissent, is a striking detail. The ma-
jority's intent may be guessed-to conjure in the reader's mind an image of
a traditional wedding dress and ceremony that is broadly recognizable, the-
reby tapping into a collective cultural imagination. Responding to the ma-
jority's invocation of the white wedding dress, the Chief Justice reiterated
the trope, somewhat facetiously, saying that "a minister officiating in a
commitment ceremony involving a same-sex couple may now be held in
violation ... (though perhaps only if at least one partner is wearing a white
dress)."56
The court returns to a description of the wedding ceremony at multiple
points in the opinion, repeating that, "[a]t the ceremony, Stubbs wore a
white dress, which she considered a wedding dress."57 Also repeated is the
fact that there was a religious leader officiating, that the couple repeated
vows "typical of a traditional ceremony,"58 and that Ruth Stubbs referred to
the ceremony as a marriage. 9 Reinforcing the authority of visual markers,
the court also adverts to the fact guests were present to witness the ceremo-
ny and photographers captured images of the ceremony. A vocabulary of
viewing and spectatorship is woven throughout the opinion as well, embroi-
dering it with words like "appeared," "regarded," "seems," and "material."'
The court's conclusion is that "the ceremony in which Holm and
Stubbs participated appeared, in every material respect, indistinguishable
53. Id. at 4, 137 P.3d at 731 (majority opinion).
54. Id. at 2, 137 P.3d at 730.
55. Id. at 5, 137 P.3d at 731.
56. Id. at 144, 137 P.3d at 762-63 (Durham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
57. Id. at 30, 137 P.3d at 736 (majority opinion).
58. Id. at 30, 137 P.3d at 737.
59. Id. at 31,137P.3dat737.
60. Id. at 5, 21, 30, 137 P.3d at 731, 734, 737.
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from a marriage ceremony to which this State grants legal recognition on a
daily basis."'" The suggestion that Stubbs and Holm "engaged in a relation-
ship that mirrored that of a traditional marriage"62 is powerful because it
elevates the religious ceremony to the level of legal procedure. The sugges-
tion also becomes purposeful when the court references the aim of the bi-
gamy statute, namely to prevent "all the indicia of marriage repeated more
than once."63 The plural marriage "sealing" ceremony is simultaneously
worthy of legal status because it looks like a conventional wedding and sub-
ject to penalty because it mimics the "marriage ceremony to which [the]
State grants legal recognition on a daily basis."' The use of these formal,
visual cues does not go unnoticed in the dissent opinion. In her dissent,
Chief Justice Durham observed that the "majority upholds Holm's criminal
bigamy conviction based solely on his participation is a private religious
ceremony because the form of that ceremony-though not its intent-
resembled what we think of as a wedding."65
II. PUBLICITY REQUIREMENTS AND LOCAL MEANING
A visual definition of marriage is not necessarily an unusual or unex-
pected standard or criteria for the Utah court, or any court, to adopt. Mar-
nages, both formal and informal, have traditionally been defined by some
visual component, performed in conjunction with the exchange of vows,
religious contracting, and state licensing. The visual components correlate
with ceremony, spectacle, and publicity. Unlike a private exchange of vows
or private contract, a visual ceremony communicates the form and force of
the act to a wider swath of individuals and invites community participation.
This dissemination of information is the essence of publicity for a theorist
like Jeremy Bentham, who observed that:
Publicity and privacy have for their measure the number of the persons to whom
knowledge of the matters of fact in question is considered as communicated, or ca-
pable of being communicated. The degree of actual publicity will be great or high,
in the direct ratio of the number of persons to whose minds the knowledge of the
matter or matters of fact in question has been communicated.66
The publicity principle, as defined by Bentham, assumes that a society de-
rives benefit from exposure to information-the more people in possession
61. Id. at 30, 137 P.3d at 737.
62. Id. at 81, 137 P.3d at 747.
63. State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, 147, 99 P.3d 820. 832 (Utah 2004).
64. Holm, 2006UT31, 30,137 P.3d at737.
65. Id. at 132, 137 P.3d at 758 (Durham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
66. Jeremy Bentham, Of Publicity and Privacy, As Applied to Judicature In Gener-
al, and to the Collection of the Evidence In Particular, in RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE,
SPECIALLY APPLIED TO ENGLISH PRACTICE 511, 512 (1827).
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of knowledge, the better. For Bentham, however, the publicity principle did
not just involve public knowledge but public judgment. His Public Opinion
Tribunal represented the embodiment of public judgment and imagined a
vehicle through which public opinion would carry socio-political as well as
moral weight. The Public Opinion Tribunal was a "fictitious tribunal ...
reigned under the pressure of inevitable necessity for the purpose of dis-
course to designate the imaginary tribunal or judiciary by which the pu-
nishments and rewards of which the popular or moral sanction is composed
are applied."67 This fictional tribunal had four core functions: to provide
and review evidence, to express "approbation or disapprobation" (the "cen-
sorial function"), the "executive function" of granting or withholding re-
ward, and the "melioration-suggestive function" of proposing improve-
ments.6" In the marital context, the public and publicity components to the
marriage ceremony tracked several of Bentham's functions by not only en-
dowing a marrying couple with the reward of status and legitimacy, but also
by providing visual recordation that doubled as evidentiary proof and ex-
pressing collective approbation as appropriate.
A. Publicity as Evidence: Endowment at the Church Door
Early marriage traditions, developed in late medieval times and con-
tinued into the early-modem period, strategically deployed publicity re-
quirements. In order to be legally married, a couple could exchange vows
and be married per verba de praesenti. A "spiritual contract expressed with
present intent (per verba de praesenti), once made, would not admit further
hesitation or bargaining, for in the eyes of the church it constituted a bind-
ing marriage."'69 Canon law was satisfied by this exchange of present-tense
vows that signaled present intent, consent, and capability.7° A couple was
not, however, entitled the full range of marital benefits or protection from
third-party disruption without a public solemnization ceremony.
One problem with the private exchange of vows was that this ex-
change provided no proof of marriage and therefore no protection against
other, future claimants to the same husband or wife. A man could easily
exchange private vows with one woman and subsequently marry another,
67. JEREMY BENTHAM, Constitutional Code Rationale, in FIRST PRINCIPLES
PREPARATORY TO CONSITUTIONAL CODE 283,283 (Philip Schofield ed., 1989).
68. JEREMY BENTHAM, The Constitutional Code, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 158, 158 (John Bowring ed., 1856); see also Fred Cutler, Jeremy Bentham and the
Public Opinion Tribunal, 63 PUB. OPINION Q. 321, 328 (1999).
69. R.H. Helmholz, Marriage Contracts in Medieval England, in To HAVE AND TO
HOLD: MARRYING AND ITS DOCUMENTATION IN WESTERN CHRISTENDOM, 400-1600, at 260,
264 (Philip L. Reynolds & John Witte Jr. eds., 2007).
70. Frederick Pederson, Marriage Contracts and the Church Courts of Fourteenth-
Century England, in To HAVE AND TO HOLD, supra note 69, at 287, 289.
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either in private or in a public ceremony. In this type of situation, "public
ceremony or the witnessed contract would prevail over the private exchange
of vows."'" "[C]anon law explicitly stated that the sole confession of the
parties themselves was not sufficient. '72 Public ceremony and public partic-
ipation through witnessing provided proof of a marriage and created a legal
right for each spouse that was subsequently enforceable in the spiritual
court, were dispute to arise.
Common law courts similarly required public performance of the mar-
riage before recognizing marital property rights. A significant right created
through solemnized marriage was a wife's endowment. Through a process
known as endowment at the church door, a wife gained her dower right the
moment that the marriage was acknowledged at the church doorway in a
public ceremony.73 The custom was for "the bridegroom to endow his bride
...at the time of the marriage ceremony performed at the church door.
There, using words of present gift, he named the lands which she should
have for her dower after his death. ' 74 Because of the property interests at
stake "royal courts were anxious for the acts which gave rights in land to be
open and notorious, and they refused to recognize an endowment which had
not been made publicly in this way. '75 Pollock and Maitland called this
"Bracton's rule" and confirmed that "[n]o woman can claim dower unless
she has been endowed at the church door."76 Pollock and Maitland also
confirmed that the ritual of endowment at the church door was, at its core, a
publicity requirement: "what our justices are demanding is, not a religious
rite, nor 'the presence of an ordained clergyman,' but publicity. '7  Like the
public ceremony of solemnization that proved a private exchange of vows,
the endowment ceremony also provided necessary evidence in cases of dis-
pute. "As a result, it became less obvious that the churchdoor ceremony
71. REBECCA PROBERT, MARRIAGE LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE LONG EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY: A REASSESSMENT 29 (2009).
72. Id.
73. 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 1 372-74 (1895).
74. George L. Haskins, The Development of Common Law Dower, 62 HARV. L.
REV. 42,45-46 (1949).
75. Id. at 46; see also POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 73, at 373 ("The justices
who demanded an endowment at the church door were the justices who set their faces against
testamentary gifts of land, and strenuously endeavoured to make livery of seisin mean a real
change of possession. The acts which give rights in land should be public, notorious acts.").
76. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 73, at 372.
77. Id. Pollock and Maitland come to this conclusion because "Bracton tells us that
the endowment can and must be made at the church door even during an interdict when the
bridal mass can not be celebrated." Id. at 372-73.
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actually created property rights than that it provided public proof that a mar-
riage existed from which property rights derived."78
B. Publicity as Accountability: Marriage Banns
Publicity requirements embodied in the practice of proclaiming mar-
riage banns represented an attempt to foster transparency by creating collec-
tive accountability for the validity of the marriage. Marriage banns dated
back to a 1200 council of Lambeth constitution and a 1215 Lateran council
proclamation by Pope Innocent 1II,79 but their use most likely predated those
proclamations by a great number of years as customary use.8" Pollack and
Maitland noted that banns were intended as a "calling upon all and singular
to declare any cause or just impediment that could be urged against the pro-
posed union."'" Ecclesiastical authorities designed banns to elicit communi-
ty knowledge of and reporting on any existing impediments to a marriage.
The impediments in question were, legally speaking, much then what they
are today-age, consent, existing marriage, and consanguinity.82  A pre-
existing marriage was a difficult impediment to discover and was, "by far
the most important impediment legally and socially."83
Banns were designed to uncover precontracts by subjecting a be-
trothed couple to public scrutiny.84 The parish priest announced the wed-
ding plans on three separate occasions in the local church, advertising the
couple's intention and allowing time for witnesses to come forward.85 In
answer to the question of when, or at which religious service, the priest
would read the banns, one religious commentator remarked, "it is not the
place that matters most, but the presence of the people, . . . therefore the
banns might be published in chapels, or even any place in which Mass
would be celebrated with a large concourse of people."86 Banns were an
integral part of marriage reform under the 1563 Council of Trent, whose
78. Christine Peters, Gender, Sacrament and Ritual: The Making and Meaning of
Marriage in Late Medieval and Early Modern England, 169 PAST & PRESENT 63, 81 (2000).
79. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 73, at 368.
80. LYNN D. WARDLE & LAURENCE C. NOLAN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF
FAMILY LAW 158 (2d ed. 2006).
81. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 73, at 368.
82. Michael M. Sheehan, Choice of Marriage Partner in the Middle Ages: Devel-
opment and mode of application of a theory of marriage, in MEDIEVAL FAMILIES:
PERSPECTIVES ON MARRIAGE, HOUSEHOLD, AND CHILDREN 157, 167-70 (Carol Neel ed.,
2004).
83. Shannon McSheffrey, Place, Space, and Situation: Public and Private in the
Making of Marriage in Late-Medieval London, 79 SPECULUM 960, 966 (2004).
84. Id. at 965.
85. Id.
86. H.A. AYRINHAC, MARRIAGE LEGISLATION IN THE NEW CODE OF CANON LAW 57
(1918).
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goal was to stem clandestine marriage and "protect against the sin of illegal
second marriages by instituting formal and public marriage requirements." 7
The reforms that arose from the Council of Trent confirmed the Lambeth
principles and those of the Lateran council and added to the banns require-
ment by "making the validity of marriage dependent on its being performed
before a priest and in the presence of two or three witnesses."88
When the English Parliament passed Lord Hardwicke's Marriage Act
in 1753, clandestine marriages were similarly a target. (The bill was named
An Act for the better preventing of Clandestine Marriages.)89 Also targets,
however, were the quick "Fleet Street"9 marriages and crimes of mobility,
such as polygamy "in its eighteenth-century version, where men married
several times, abandoning wives and children as they went along."'" Ac-
cording to the government, the Act was "designed to prevent rich heirs and
heiresses of good family from being seduced into clandestine or runaway
marriages with their social or economic inferiors."92 The Act therefore sti-
pulated new residency requirements and stated that marriage banns "were to
be called in the parishes where the parties had resided for a month before-
hand."93 A couple was required to give a week's notice to the minister or
priest, and if the couple did not follow the rules set out by the Marriage Act
the individuals were subject to felony prosecution and transportation.94 Pub-
licity in the context of marriage banns consequently operated -to ensure
transparency by requiring the betrothed couple to engage in public perfor-
mance, community affiliation, and broad advertising.
C. Publicity as Legitimacy: Wedding Announcements
The ceremonial and publication traditions associated with marriage
"underscore the idea that spousal accountability extends to the community
as well as to the partner .... [W]edding announcements, and the participa-
87. Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a
Shared Moral Life, 75 GEO. L. J. 1829, 1853 (1987).
88. Id.
89. An Act for the Better Preventing of Clandestine Marriages, (1753) 21 THE
STATUTES AT LARGE, FROM THE 26 T TO THE 3 0 TH YEAR OF KING GEORGE 11 124, 124 (Eng.).
90. Fleet Street Marriages "were held in the area round the Fleet Prison known as
the Rules. Such marriages required no publication of banns, no parental consent nor any
other formal interference from outsiders.... Nearly everything to do with such marriages
had a sordid and semi-criminal reputation .... " PETER EARLE, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH
MIDDLE CLASS: BUSINESS, SOCIETY, AND FAMILY LIFE IN LONDON, 1660-1730, at 178 (1989).
91. Eve Tavor Bannet, The Marriage Act of 1753: "A Most Cruel Law for the Fair
Sex," 30 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES 233, 239 (1997).
92. Id. at 233.
93. R.B. OUTHWAITE, CLANDESTINE MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1500-1850, at 79
(1995).
94. Id.
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tion of family and friends in the wedding ceremony all suggest the impor-
tance of community witness to the mutual expression of commitment." 95
While public performance of the wedding confirms the legal status of the
couple by creating evidence and accountability, the same public perfor-
mance also confers social status. Marriage, as a "passage of status" 96 calls
for publicity not only to expose information but also to "sanction[] a new
social position." 97 Bentham envisioned this same function for his Public
Opinion Tribunal exercising its censorial and executive functions, dispens-
ing or withholding the status good of reputation. A modem iteration of the
marriage banns-the wedding announcement-reflects this use of publicity
in the service of status.
After the passage of Lord Hardwicke's Act allowed a marriage license
to substitute for the calling of banns (as long as a solemnization ceremony
took place),98 banns evolved into vehicles for status proclamations in the
form of wedding announcements, sent by card or published in a newspaper.
In this modem marriage practice, announcements are sent by card or pub-
lished in a newspaper." Papers like the New York Times began regularly
publishing wedding announcements by end of the nineteenth century, and a
published notice in the Times or another large-circulation paper quickly
became a status standard. "[T]here is nothing more prestigious than being
featured in The New York Times wedding announcements in the Sunday
Styles section,"' 0 because the "New York Times wedding announcements..
. are, after all, an ultimate sign of societal status."'' Operating on the
theory that a "wedding, with all the attendant festivities, is an important
manifestation of the social position of the families involved,"'0 2 news media
created specific space to publicize upscale unions and society mergers, just
as royal and aristocratic weddings had been announced and publicized in
previous centuries.0 3
95. Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1901, 1917 (2000).
96. EDWARD MUIR, RITUAL IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 33 (2005).
97. Id.
98. OUTHWAITE, supra note 93, at 82.
99. PEGGY POST, EMILY POST'S WEDDING ETIQUETTE 6 (5th ed. 2006).
100. Sebastian, The New York Times Newspaper Wedding Announcements: The Gold
Standard of Wedding Announcements, http:/Ihubpages.com/hub/The-New-York-Times-
Newspaper-Wedding-Announcements (last visited April 4, 2011).
101. Brenda Cossman, Betwixt and Between Recognition: Migrating Same-Sex Mar-
riages and the Turn Toward the Private, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 155 (2008).
102. David L. Hatch & Mary A. Hatch, Criteria of Social Status as Derived from
Marriage Announcements in the New York Times, 12 AM. Soc. REV. 396, 396 (1947).
103. For an example of the use of royal weddings to create and use publicity, see
David Cannadine, The Context, Performance, and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy
and the 'Invention of Tradition', c. 1820-1977, in THE INVENTION OF TRADITION 101, 101-64
(Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983).
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This type of publicity, and the promise of social status that it offered,
confirmed the position of leading families, but it also opened the door to
new families who were trying to establish their social legitimacy. In a study
from 1947, two sociologists found that the majority of couples listed in the
Times wedding announcements, while hailing from the upper social eche-
lons as defined by profession and education, were not listed in New York's
Social Register. Their research found that the "emphasis upon achievement
in professions and business by relatives and parents contributes to mobility
in this social system.""
Wedding announcements have also mirrored recent shifts in the de-
mographics of upper classes. Wedding announcements, from this perspec-
tive, have contributed to validating new forms of social and marital order-
ing. As Emily Post's granddaughter wrote in 2005, updating her grand-
mother's classic wedding etiquette book: "The New York Times made jour-
nalism history in 2002 when the newspaper began including commitment
ceremonies among its traditional wedding write-ups. A number of large
city newspapers have followed suit."'0 5 The move to include commitment
ceremonies demonstrated a progressive sense of social values. Class and
status concerns remained prominent, leading one commentator to note that
"[t]he gays on the wedding pages of today's New York Times are remarka-
ble for their elite status, not for their sexuality.""° The point of inclusion,
however, may not have been to underscore the need for marriage equality,
but rather to demonstrate that same-sex couples shared prestige markers
with their opposite-sex counterparts.
III. WHICH PUBLIC? DEFINING COMMUNITIES
Publicity requirements highlight the fact of a viewing audience, insist
on the act of witnessing (sometimes legally), and implicate a particular
community. Bentham's principle that the degree of publicity corresponds to
the number of people who are informed understands community as a broad
104. Hatch & Hatch, supra note 102, at 403. The study found that the important
criteria were, outstanding occupational achievements by all the male members. Id.
The social status of parents, which appears to be associated with occupational
achievement, is strongly influential in setting standards of personal achievement
for the children. Among the attributes valued by this group are graduation from
private school, graduation from college and professional school for men, a debut
and marriage for a woman, and acceptance by certain formalized social groups.
Id.
105. POST, supra note 99, at 9.
106. Marguerite Moritz, Say I Do, Gay Weddings in Mainstream Media, in MEDIA
QUEERED: VISIBILITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 180, 182 (Kevin G. Bamhurst ed., 2007).
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and undifferentiated group, perhaps best defined as a nation's citizenry. 7
Because transparency and accountability are two of Bentham's paramount
virtues, the lack of a differentiated citizenry is both purposeful and accepta-
ble. Optimal publicity requires that as many people as possible have access
to the utmost information possible, disseminated through media and other
channels.' °8 This notion of publicity posits a large public, associated with a
certain type of community-also large, perhaps national, and connected
loosely by shared interest in improved governance. This type of publicity
trades in nation-state rules and norms that shape the legal backdrop against
which communities form and marriages take place.
Traditional marriage practices requiring publicity reveal another con-
cept of public, however, that places importance on the local community.
Traditional marriage practices assume equivalence between public and
community because the audience for a wedding ceremony is a highly specif-
ic one, created through geographic proximity and familial connection. The
traditional ceremonies are grounded in place and given status by the collec-
tive of people in that place. Legal rules about marriage, in the American
context, are firmly entrenched in state-level regulation that varies distinctly
according to national geography. The demands for publicity particular to
marriage may depend in some ways on a thinly sliced and highly differen-
tiated public. Changes to marriage law and regulation, however, may create
new ways to think about local affiliation and draw local borders.
A. Traditional Borders: Village, State, and Nation-State
The importance of the local community is evident from the marriage
banns requirement, insisting as it does on a couple's attachment to a specific
parish and actively soliciting the input of parish members."° The natural
boundedness of the parish as a unit of community, sociability, and gover-
nance simplified, historically, the job of defining a community. Friends and
neighbors in the parish brought information, opinion, approval, and status to
107. See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 896
(2006) ("Bentham, for example, argued that publicity enables closer relations between the
state and its public by securing the confidence of the governed in the legislature, by facilitat-
ing communication between the state and the public, and by creating a more informed electo-
rate.").
108. Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar & Robert J. McCarthy Jr., Panopticism and Public-
ity: Bentham's Quest for Transparency, 6 PUB. CULTURE 547, 554 (1994) ("Publicity, un-
derstood as an institutional arrangement representing both a juridical condition (the freedom
of speech and press) and a technology (print), facilitates the transformation of opinion into
public opinion through rational-critical discussion.").
109. See McSheffrey, supra note 83, at 966; see also discussion supra Section II.B.
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the marriage, just as the banns obliged a couple to authorize and advertise
reciprocal recognition of community belonging."'
Moving past the parish, a traditional site of the American localism and
marriage regulation is the state. Domestic relations regulation has tradition-
ally been an exception to federal diversity jurisdiction and a source for fed-
eral court abstention."' Individual states have been the source of the ma-
jority of law regulating marriage, divorce, and child custody. Each state
cares for its own household matters and defines marriage according to the
preferences of the population. The reverse-that marriages define the
state-may also, however, be true. New York's argument for ownership of
Ellis Island in a 1998 Supreme Court case rested in part on the fact that mar-
riages licensed in New York were performed on the island."2 New York
presented evidence of some half-dozen marriage certificates registered on
the island, augmenting the evidence with interviews of Island employees
and historians "who recalled 'numberless' weddings on the Island (said to
have been solemnized under New York law) until the policy of marrying
immigrants on the Island was dropped and the immigrants were brought to
City Hall in New York instead.""' 3 In the absence of greater number and
any recordation, this argument failed; however, the fact that the state at-
tempted to define its territory through the marriages performed remains
telling.
State regulation also has a pivotal position in current American con-
versations about marriage because of the fraught division between state and
federal law on the recognition of same-sex marriage. Although a growing
number of states recognize same-sex marriage, the federal prohibition on
the recognition of these same-sex marriages for federal purposes creates
tension. "' The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) underscores that tension,
stating that "[n]o State... shall be required to give effect to any public act,
record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or
tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State."' ' DOMA puts
110. See supra Part II.B.
111. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 693 (1992) ("The domestic rela-
tions exception upon which the courts below relied to decline jurisdiction has been invoked
often by the lower federal courts. The seeming authority for doing so originally stemmed
from the announcement in Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859), that the federal
courts have no jurisdiction over suits for divorce or the allowance of alimony.").
112. New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 795-96 (1998).
113. Id. at 795 n.16.
114. Given the recent decision of President Obama and his direction to the DOJ to
stop defending DOMA, this is in flux. See Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Turna-
bout, US. Says Marriage Act Blocks Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2011, at Al.
115. Pub. L. 104-199, §2(a), 100 Stat. 2419 (Sep. 21, 1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1738C (1997)).
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states at the forefront of defining their own boundaries and values when
marriage recognition is at stake, while also creating new affinities between
states."6  Somewhat ironically, because of the state-centric values pro-
moted by DOMA, DOMA also provides a federal point of affiliation for
opponents of same-sex marriage and a "nation-state" perspective on the
marriage debate. In other countries, citizens may also affiliate strongly with
national marriage regulation. Whether in a more liberal country like the
Netherlands," 7 Sweden, or Canada, or in more conservative, Catholic coun-
tries in Latin America, citizens may view the form of marriage regulation
that is particular to their country as an expression of substantive national
values. Even at the national level, then, communities can affiliate around
marriage law and, in so doing, reinforce traditional articulations of political
sovereignty by respecting the traditional borders of jurisdiction that define
state or nation-state.
B. Believable Boundaries
While individuals and couples define their communities according to
geographic and political boundaries, significant self-identification occurs
outside of and across those borders as well. Belief in a community does
strong work in creating that very community. In New Jersey v. New York,
the Court observed "that the belief of the, inhabitants of disputed territory
that they are citizens of one of the competing States is 'of no inconsiderable
importance.""'" Making the same point, from a somewhat different angle,
Benedict Anderson remarked that "[c]ommunities are to be distinguished..
• by the style in which they are imagined.""' 9 From this perspective, a com-
munity forms when individuals imagine themselves to share not just a set of
neighborhood blocks, but also a set of historical understandings, socio-
cultural values, and political mythologies. These communities are "im-
agined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know
most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the
minds of each lives the image of their communion." '
116. DOMA and the focus on state recognition of same-sex marriage has sparked
great debate about federalism and ways in which individuals can reward certain states for a
progressive stance of same-sex marriage. See IAN AYRES & JENNIFER GERARDA BROWN,
STRAIGHTFORWARD: HOW TO MOBILIZE HETEROSEXUAL SUPPORT FOR GAY RIGHTS 60-78
(2005).
117. M.V. LEE BADGETT, WHEN GAY PEOPLE GET MARRIED 25 (2009).
118. New Jersey, 523 U.S. at 798 (citing Handly's Lessee v. Anthony, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 374, 384 (1820)).
119. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN
AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 6 (1983).
120. Id.
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These imagined communities sometimes map on to geographically de-
fined communities; however, instances occur in which citizens of tradition-
ally defined communities prefer to seek membership in an imagined com-
munity that transcends state or national borders, coalescing around an idea
or a cause. "Dominant practices inevitably create a baseline against which
other behaviors are assessed as properly a public (here meaning seen by
others) display or as deviant.'. 2  Social configurations resulting from domi-
nant norms can subsequently "be extremely oppressive, either to their mem-
bers or to outsiders."' 2 An attractive option is to affiliate with an imagined
and imaginative community, one that is responsive to and accepting of dif-
ferences that might not be tolerated by traditional communities, whether
large or small. In a modem, cosmopolitan context, with easily accessible
technological resources, connecting with communities outside the territo-
rially local is eminently possible.
The debate over same-sex marriage-and the continued prohibition on
same-sex marriage in many states and at the federal level-has spurred mar-
riage-minded individuals to create these advocacy and issue-based com-
munities. Local gay rights organizations, progressive media outlets, and
political advocacy groups organize members across state and even national
boundaries and offer couples, both same- and opposite-sex, the chance to
collaborate and socialize with like-minded individuals in the name of creat-
ing marriage equality. Various proposals offer ways for individuals to show
their support for states with certain marriage policies, even if they are not a
resident of the state in question.'23 The same holds true for those opposed to
same-sex marriage (or in favor of alternate conservative forms of marriage,
like the covenant marriage). That is, multiple outlets exist to facilitate di-
alogue, collaboration, and resource sharing around the issue. On both sides
of the political debate surrounding same-sex marriage, these imagined
communities are practicing "law as affiliation"'24 and both "mak[ing] con-
nections with a particular legal regime as facets of themselves"'25 and
"[e]nacting those obligations through organized, routine activities builds
social solidarity, as required behaviors inscribe shared values and beliefs."'2 6
121. Judith Resnik, Living Their Legal Commitments: Paideic Communities, Courts
and Robert Cover, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 17, 19 (2005).
122. Judith Resnik, Law as Affiliation: "Foreign" Law, Democratic Federalism, and
the Sovereigntism of the Nation-State, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L. 33, 36 (2008).
123. AYERs & BROWN, supra note 116.
124. Resnik, supra note 122, at 35.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Thinking about the new possibilities for marriage that technology and
mobility enable presents the opportunity to think about the role of the visu-
al, the public, and the local in marriage practice and law. Traditional mar-
riage practices have a strong visual component, embodied in the wedding
ceremony and requirements for public performance of that ritual. These
visual components signal deep publicity values that the announcement and
advertising of the marriage enact. The visual and the performative nature of
the marriage ceremony also generate questions about the most relevant as
well as the most desirable audience. Local audiences, defined territorially,
compose the conventional audience because the marriage ceremony is site-
specific, marriage law is state-bound, and status endowment comes from the
social network in which the couple's daily lives are embedded. Because
definitions of marriage are being contested and alternative sources of au-
thority are emerging-generated in large part by the marriage equality
movement-publicity may have a new role and what defines local may be
transforming. Within the landscape of same-sex marriage, the definition of
the public is in play and has become political; likewise, the local has been
energized as a vibrant, energy-rich network of dedicated individuals and
advocate organizations. As marriage practice and law continue to evolve
and encompass new forms, these new, networked communities will want to
be both strategic about using publicity for a range of specific purposes and
sensitive to the alignment between the purpose being served by publicity
and the chosen audience. Not all audiences can serve as legal witness; not
all audiences can grant status; not all audiences can create political momen-
tum. A key for bringing success to new marriage practices is therefore to
match the public and the place.

